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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 2, 1980, the United States Supreme Court handed down a lengthy
and confusing opinion in Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Ameri-
can Petroleum Institute,' marking a major setback for the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). Affirming the decision of the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals,2 but for substantially different reasons, the Court
struck down OSHA's attempted regulation of the toxic substance benzene, a
known carcinogen.3
This Case Comment will examine the issues presented to the Court, the
arguments of the parties and the Court's opinion, and then will attempt to
expose some of the weaknesses in the decision. Following this analysis, this
Comment will present a brief discussion of the impact the opinion may have
on future regulatory efforts by OSHA and on certain aspects of administrative
law.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Dangers Posed by Exposure to Benzene
Benzene is an essential industrial compound used in the manufacture of
pesticides, solvents, other organic chemicals, detergents, and paints, and is
an important ingredient in many petroleum based fuels.4 Unfortunately, as is
the case with a growing number of industrial chemicals, the value of benzene
for improving the quality of life cannot be separated from its capacity to
destroy the lives of those who work with it.
1. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
2. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978).
3. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1028 (1978). The findings of fact and explanations relevant to the standard can be
found at 43 Fed. Reg. 5918 (1978), as amended by 43 Fed. Reg. 27,962 (1978).
4. 581 F.2d 493, 497-98 (5th Cir. 1978); 43 Fed. Reg. 5918 (1978), as amended by 43 Fed. Reg. 27,962
(1978).
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Exposure to airborne particles in concentrations of 20,000 parts benzene
per million parts air (20,000 ppm) can cause death in minutes. Short term
exposure at lower levels (250-500 ppm) can cause vertigo, nausea, headache,
nervous excitation, and breathlessness. When exposure is halted, recovery
from these symptoms is rapid. More insidious, however, is the harm caused
by low exposure levels over long periods of time. Chronic exposure at levels
as low as twenty-five ppm has been shown to cause both malignant and
nonmalignant blood disorders and chromosomal aberrations.5 Because
of this, exposure standards have been set by different health organiza-
tions at different periods in time. In 1946, the American Conference of
Governmental Industrial Hygenists recommended a peak exposure level of
100 ppm. This value was reduced to fifty ppm in 1947, thirty-five ppm in 1948,
twenty-five ppm in 1963, and ten ppm in 1974.6 This ten ppm standard also had
been adopted earlier, in 1969, by the National Standards Institute and was
adopted by OSHA in 1971 pursuant to procedures set out in section 6(a) of theOccupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act).7
B. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
The purpose of the OSH Act was to provide the Secretary of Labor with
the proper tools to assure America's workers a safe and healthful working
environment. 8 The rule making provisions" required the Secretary to adopt
permissible exposure standards for toxic substances within two years of the
time the Act became law and to set out general notice and comment pro-
cedures to be followed when evidence indicated a need for a more stringent
standard.
The relevant provisions of the OSH Act at issue in Industrial Union
Department are sections 3(8) and 6(b)(5). Section 3(8) provides, "The term
'occupational safety and health standard' means a standard which requires
conditions, or the adoption or use of one or more practices, means, methods,
operations, or processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe
or healthful employment and places of employment.""0 When toxic materials
or harmful physical agents are of concern, section 6(b)(5) provides:
5. 43 Fed. Reg. 5918, 5921 (1978).
6. Id.
7. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976). Section 6(a) of the Act
provides:
Without regard to chapter5 of Title 5, or to the other subsections of this section, the Secretary shall, as
soon as practible during the period beginning with the effective date of this chapter and ending two
years after such date, by rule promulgate as an occupational safety or health standard any national
consensus standard, and any established Federal standard, unless he determines that the promulgation
of such a standard would not result in improved safety or health for specifically designated employees.
In the event of conflict among any such standards, the Secretary shall promulgate the standard which
assures the greatest protection of the safety or health of the affected employees.
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 6(a), 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1976).
8. See note 20 infra.
9. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1976).
10. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 3(8), 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1976) (emphasis added).
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The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful
physical agents under this subsection, shall set the standard which most ade-
quately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence,
that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity
even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such
standard for the period of his working life. Development of standards under this
subsection shall be based upon research, demonstrations, experiments, and such
other information as may be appropriate. In addition to the attainment of the
highest degree of health and safety protection for the employee, other considera-
tions shall be the latest available scientific data in the field, the feasibility of the
standards, and experience gained under this and other health and safety laws."
C. OSHA's Actions
In the 1970s, enough evidence was gathered to show conclusively that
long-exposure to benzene at levels about twenty-five ppm could lead
to leukemia, a cancerous blood disorder that normally causes death
within six to fourteen months after discovery. 12 However, because of the
limited amounts of accurate data on cancers and their causes, anyone at-
tempting to establish a viable regulatory policy has been forced to address
issues "on the frontiers of scientific and medical knowledge." 13 In the words
of one commentator, "[A] regulator who is given the responsibility for estab-
lishing a safe level for human exposure to a carcinogen has been given an
impossible task if this entails establishing that a threshold 'no effect' level [of
exposure] exists." 14
OSHA responded to this problem with a generic carcinogen policy. Once
the carcinogenicity of a substance had been demonstrated qualitatively,
OSHA assumed that no safe level of exposure exists in the absence of a
showing to the contrary and accordingly set the exposure limit at the lowest
feasible level.' 5 Thus, in the absence of proof that a ten ppm level of exposure
was safe, OSHA promulgated a regulation requiring employers to limit
employee exposure to benzene to one ppm averaged over an eight hour
day. 16 In so doing, the agency acted in reliance on its statutory man-
date to set "the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent
feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will
suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity." 7 Industry re-
11. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 6(b)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976).
12. 43 Fed. Reg. 5918, 5925, 5926 (1978).
13. 43 Fed. Reg. 5918. 5932 (1978).
14. McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Ques-
tions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729, 734 (1979).
15. 43 Fed. Reg. 5918, 5932 (1978); American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493,507 (5th Cir. 1978).
16. The scope of the new standard would, by OSHA's estimates, affect 629,000 employees in various
industries at an initial cost approaching $500 million, but would not apply to 795,000 service station employees
who encounter benzene exposure on a daily basis at minimal levels. 43 Fed. Reg. 5918, 5935 (1978). See also
Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 618 n.6 (1980). OSHA's explanation of the
costs of compliance shows that only 35,000 workers would actually derive any benefits from the standard
requiring initial expenditures on a rough average of more than $14,000 per benefited employee.
17. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 6(b)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976) (emphasis added).
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sponded by challenging the regulations in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit. 8
Industry representatives argued that substantial evidence' 9 and the best
available evidence did not show that the proposed standards were reasonably
necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places
of employment. OSHA responded that not only were the standards supported
by substantial evidence, the best available evidence, feasibility considera-
tions, and a statutory mandate to protect workers, 20 but also section 3(8),
a definitional section, has no substantive effect, and, therefore, no require-
ment to promulgate only standards that are reasonably necessary or appropri-
ate exists. 2'
D. The Opinion of the Fifth Circuit
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, relying on its decision in Aqua
Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. Consumer Product Safety Commission,"2 held that
OSHA could not summarily dismiss the language of section 3(8): "The Act
imposes on OSHA the obligation to enact only standards that are reasonably
necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful workplaces. If a stand-
ard does not fit in this definition, it is not one that OSHA is authorized to
enact." 23 The court went on to say that the only way to evaluate whether a
regulation was reasonably necessary or appropriate was to weigh the potential
the standard had for reducing the severity or frequency of the risk of harm
against the expected costs of compliance. In promulgating the benzene stand-
ard, OSHA acted on the assumption that since exposure to high levels of
benzene posed a high risk of health impairment, the lower the level of expo-
sure the lower the risk. However, in the appellate court's view, the agency
could not show with substantial evidence that lowering the exposure limit
from ten ppm to one ppm would provide any measurable benefits and could
not, therefore, justify the 500 million dollar price tag.24
In striking down the benzene standard, the Fifth Circuit entered into
open conflict with at least three other federal appellate courts. When faced
18. Section 6(f) of the OSH Act provides that the United States courts of appeals are the proper forum for
anyone seeking judicial review of OSHA standards. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 6(f), 29
U.S.C. § 655(f) (1976).
19. Section I1(a) requires that "[t]he findings of the Commission with respect to questions of fact, if
supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole, shall be conclusive." Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 11(a), 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1976).
20. Section 2(b) of the OSH Act provides: "The Congress declares it to be its purpose and
policy.., to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working
conditions and to preserve our natural resources... by providing-for the development and promulgation of
occupational safety and health standards." Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 2(b), 29 U.S.C.
§ 651(b) (1976).
21. 581 F.2d 493, 500 (5th Cir. 1978).
22. 569 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1978). The court found that the "Safety Standard for Swimming Pool Slides"
adopted by the Consumer Products Safety Commission was improper. The court said that the standard was
based on a finding that it was reasonably necessary to eliminate or reduce an unreasonable risk of injury, as
required by statute, but that this finding was not supported by substantial evidence.
23. 581 F.2d 493, 502 (5th Cir. 1978).
24. Id.
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with proposed OSHA exposure standards and similar fact patterns, the
Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, and District of Columbia Circuits
had upheld the standards and refused to find any merit in industry argu-
ments. 25
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S REVIEW OF THE PROBLEM
A. Questions Presented
The questions presented to the Supreme Court were two-fold: first, when
promulgating new exposure standards, must the Secretary of Labor obtain his
own data from scientific tests that have not been, but could be, readily per-
formed; and second, when issuing proposed standards for limiting exposure to
toxic substances, must the Secretary weigh the benefits of such standards
against the resultant cost?
While the impact of a resolution to the first issue would be relatively
minor in the overall scheme of OSHA regulations, the impact of an affirmative
answer to the second issue would have been tremendous. Requiring cost-
benefit analysis for carcinogens, not to mention non-carcinogenic substances,
would severely hamper OSHA's efforts.26
25. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974), perhaps the leading case
in support of OSHA's position, involved the legality of a standard for exposure to asbestos dust, with the Union
arguing that OSHA's proposed standard was not strict enough. Asbestos is known to cause asbestosis and is
associated with cancers at high exposure levels. Id. at 471. In an opinion by Judge McGowan, the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the proposed standard. In so doing, the court characterized the factual questions
involved as being "on the frontiers of scientific knowledge," dependent "to a greater extent upon policy
judgments and less upon purely factual analysis." Id. at 474. As a result, those facts that could be characterized
as adjudicative would be subject to a substantial evidence standard of review, but those facts that could be
characterized as legislative would be examined only to ensure that the findings were not arbitrary and capri-
cious. (For a discussion of the distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts see K. DAVIS, ADMINI-
STRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 12:3 & 12:4 (2d ed. 1979)). The court also refused to bar the agency from
considering economic feasibility when promulgating new standards, but did not say that the agency must
consider such factors. 499 F.2d 467, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
In American Iron and Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825 (3rd Cir. 1978), the steel industry challenged the
stringency of OSHA's proposed standards for exposure to carcinogenic coke oven emissions (benzene-based
gases). Adhering to its policy that there is no safe level of exposure to a carcinogen, OSHA set a standard that it
considered technologically and economically feasible (.15 milligrams of emissions per cubic meter of air).
Making distinctions between factual (i.e., adjudicative) issues and issues that were primarily legislative in
nature, the Third Circuit held that OSHA's determination regarding the safe level of exposure was supported by
substantial evidence. Id. at 832. The court also found that the determination of an acceptable exposure level was
a legislative decision properly within the scope of the agency's congressionally delegated powers. Id. at 833.
Relying on Hodgson, the court went on to hold that the agency must take into account economic factors, but
only to ensure that the proposed standards do not cripple an industry or render it extinct. Id. at 835.
In Society of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1975). at issue was an exposure standard
for vinyl chloride, a known carcinogen with no safe level of exposure. Like the courts in Hodgson and American
Iron and Steel Inst., the Second Circuit Court of Appeals drew a distinction between factual and policy issues,
terming OSHA's proposed exposure limit a legislative policy subject only to an arbitrary and capricious stand-
ard of review. Id. at 1304. The court refused to strike down the proposed standards. In response to Industry
arguments that the standard was not technologically or economically feasible, the court answered that they
(Industry) "simply need more faith in their own technological potentialities," and that OSHA 'is not restricted
by the status quo" in the area of safety. Id. at 1309.
26. Recognizing this, the Supreme Court held in the first major case involving OSHA regulations since
Industrial Union Dep't that such a balancing is unnecessary. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 101 S.
Ct. 2478 (1981). For a brief discussion of the absolute safety versus cost-benefit approaches, see DeLong,
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B. OSHA's Argument
OSHA argued that the Fifth Circuit improperly construed the statute and
that section 3(8) of the Act imposed no limitations on section 6(b)(5):27 "So
long as the standard meets the other requirements of the Act, Section [3(8)]
permits the Secretary to issue any standard that he rationally concludes is
appropriate for the protection of the health and safety of employees under the
substantive provisions of the Act."- 28 And, with respect to these standards,
OSHA argued that the language of section 6(b)(5) "is an unmistakable instruc-
tion from Congress that employee health is to be achieved even at great cost.
The policy of Congress is that cost may be considered only to determine what
is 'feasible.' 29
When construing the "reasonably necessary or appropriate" language of
section 3(8), the Fifth Circuit relied on its opinion in Aqua Slide 'N' Dive
Corp. v. Consumer Product Safety Commission,30 in which it construed simi-
lar language as requiring cost-benefit assessments by the Consumer Product
Safety Commission when promulgating safety standards. OSHA, however,
argued that Aqua Slide could be distinguished from the instant case since the
language at issue in Aqua Slide came from the Consumer Product Safety Act
and required only that standards be "reasonably necessary to eliminate or
reduce an unreasonable risk of injury. . . ."' This language, said OSHA:
recognizes that some products (e.g., knives) pose a risk of harm that should be
tolerated in light of their benefits; the Act permits regulation only of risks that are
"unreasonable." In contrast, OSHA does not limit the Secretary to regulating
only "unreasonable" health risks; it authorizes the Secretary to eliminate, if
feasible, all risks of material impairment that toxic substances pose to employees'
health."
32
The agency went on to argue that the legislative history of the OSH Act
contains no mention of cost-benefit assessments and that Congress made the
determination that part of the reasonable cost of doing business was providing
a safe and healthful working environment.33 Any balancing of life and health
against the cost of their preservation was done by Congress, with the balance
being struck "in favor of maximum health protection, subject only to the
requirement of feasibility." 34 The word "feasibility," said the government,
Benzene Exposes Workers to Unresolved Issues, Legal Times of Wash., Sept. 8, 1980, at 40. See generally
Rhoads & Singer, What is Life Worth?, 51 PUB. INTEREST 74 (1978); Fried, The Value of Life, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 1415 (1965).
27. The discussion relating to OSHA's arguments is based primarily on the Brief for the Federal Parties,
Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980). The arguments presented
by the Brief for Petitioner Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO, are substantially the same, although much more
emphasis is placed by the latter on the legislative history of the OSH Act.
28. Brief for the Federal Parties, supra note 27, at 46.
29. Id. at 41-42.
30. 569 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1978).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 2058(c)(2)(A) (1976) (emphasis added).
32. Brief for the Federal Parties, supra note 27, at 47 (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 50-51.
34. Id. at 55.
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does not require a cost-benefit test. The ordinary meaning of the word is
"capable of being done," not the "desirability or benefit of doing some-
thing." 5
OSHA also took issue with the Fifth Circuit's reason for rejecting the
proposed standard banning dermal contact with benzene, 3 6 namely that there
was evidence of a simple test available for determining the dangers of such
contact, but that this test had not been performed.37 OSHA argued that this
position was improper for several reasons, including the court's failure to
recognize the provision of section 6(b)(5) limiting decisions to the "available"
evidence:
There is always more evidence just around the comer. Congress intended the
"best available evidence" approach to free the Secretary from the grip of claims
that he should wait for just one more study, sure to be conclusive. 38
If the Secretary were required to wait until the evidence had been sup-
plied-however long that might take-the power to control the timing of new
regulations would be effectively transferred from the Secretary to the affected
parties, who would have every incentive to delay. 39
In sum, the basis of OSHA's arguments was that the Fifth Circuit's
decision imposed on the agency the kind of paralysis that Congress sought to
avoid. The requirement that the Secretary first quantify the cancer risk posed
by a given exposure level and the benefits of adopting a lower standard and
then demonstrate that these benefits bear a reasonable relationship to the
costs of achieving them is unduly harsh. It is enough, said OSHA, that "[t]he
Secretary, who has a substantial scientific staff and a decade's experience in
the administration of toxic substances regulation, ' 40 find that some risk is
presented by a given exposure level, and that reducing that level will diminish
the risk, however slight it may be.
C. Industry's Response
Industry's response was to characterize OSHA's position as biased,
illogical, and unfair:
35. Id. at 56.
36. OSHA's reasons for the dermal contact ban were similar to those used for lowering the exposure
standard for airborne benzene: "This requirement is based on OSHA's policy that, in dealing with a carcinogen,
all potential routes of exposure... be limited to the extent feasible." 43 Fed. Reg. 5918, 5948 (1978). The
agency was not concerned as much with the possibility that benzene could be absorbed into the body through
intact skin as it was with absorption through damaged skin. Id. at 5948-49.
37. 581 F.2d 493, 493 (5th Cir. 1978).
38. Brief for the Federal Parties, supra note 27, at 75.
39. Id. at 81.
40. Id. at 66-67.
41. The discussion relating to Industry's position on the exposure limit for airborne benzene is based on the
Brief for Respondents, Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980). The
discussion concerning Industry's position on the dermal contact standard is based on a second brief, Brief for
Respondents the Rubber Manufacturers Association, Inc., Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
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Common sense alone suggests that OSHA's interpretation goes too far. Surely,
Congress did not intend industry, and ultimately the public, to expend vast sums
at OSHA's command to eliminate even the most miniscule risk presented by a
single substance so long as the industry could bear the cost and still survive.42
OSHA's argument was characterized as relying almost exclusively on the
first sentence of section 6(b)(5), which provides that health standards
"shall. ..[assure]... that no employee will suffer ... impairment of
health." Industry claimed this was an unfair and out-of-context reading of
the Act and that a "reading of the Act as a coherent whole refutes this
absolutist interpretation.- 43 that risks and benefits are, for the most part,
irrelevant. For example, the general purpose statement in section 2(b) pro-
vides that the purpose of the Act is to "assure so far as possible every
working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful employment and
places of employment." This, Industry said, was nothing if not a mandate to
allocate society's limited resources wisely.'M
There was also a refutation of OSHA's claims that the Secretary's find-
ings on questions of law should be given substantial deference by the Court
and that its findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence. The
agency, Industry argued, had "not articulated a long-standing and con-
sistent interpretation of the statutory provisions at issue"45 and in fact had
interpreted the provisions inconsistently in various cases, including the
present one. For example, Industry noted that OSHA's brief approved the
use of cost-benefit analysis in the promulgation of regulations, with the
agency arguing that such assessments are permitted by the Act. All this was
in spite of the fact that OSHA's case was centered on the denial of the need or
requirement of such assessments. 46
42. Brief for Respondents, supra note 41, at 32.
43. Id. at 35.
44. Id. at 35-36. Industry also provided an analysis of other health and safety acts passed by Congress. As
one of several examples, the language of the Delaney Clause of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.
§ 348(c)(3)(A) (1976), was set out as a statute requiring absolute protection by an agency. These statutes were then
compared with the Occupational Safety and Health Act in an attempt to show that it should be read in relative
rather than in absolute terms.
45. Brief for Respondents, supra note 41, at 57.
46. Id. at 55-57. Industry also argued that OSHA's reading of the Act's legislative history was erroneous. A
close reading of the Act, it argued, would show that the words "feasible" and "material" were included to
assure OSHA's adoption of "reasonable" and "practical" health standards that would not squander vast
resources on speculative or insignificant risks:
For each type of standard, the question that should properly be asked is whether the limits and
conditions that OSHA proposes are "reasonable" and "practical" and provide real benefits to
workers-not whether the affected industry can bear the costs and still survive. When the regulatory
issue is framed in this manner, the relevance of evidence on risks, benefits and cost ... is undeniable.
Id. at 51 (emphasis added).
Industry argued further that OSHA was unable to show, by substantial evidence on the record as a whole,
what benefits, if any, would be derived by reducing the permissible exposure limit. It urged that "OSHA simply
chose a number (I ppm) and then set about showing that the affected industries could achieve that limit and still
survive financially .... [OSHA] did no more than proclaim summarily that its standard would produce 'appre-
ciable benefits' without citing a shred of evidence in support of its determination" and without convincingly
refuting substantial evidence to the contrary. Id. at 71.
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The Industry argument with respect to the dermal contact issue was
aimed primarily at refuting OSHA's claim that it acted on the basis of the
"best available evidence" as required by the Act. Industry noted that even
the District of Columbia Circuit, a leader in supporting OSHA standards, had
said that while some questions may be "'on the frontiers of scientific knowl-
edge,'. . . when the facts underlying the Secretary's determination are sus-
ceptible of being found in the usual sense, that must be done, and the review-
ing court will weigh them by the substantial evidence standard." 47 Industry
then went on to show that OSHA's own statement of its reasons for the ban
on dermal contact was "startling for its lack of any significant scientific or
factual basis.""8 It was argued that in fact OSHA itself had admitted that
when it proposed the benzene standard in 1977 its studies showed that ben-
zene is not readily absorbed through intact skin. Further, Industry pointed out
that except for the evidence that a simple test was available for resolving the
issue the agency had failed to produce any such data since then.49
D. The Supreme Court's Opinion
1. The Plurality
The plurality opinion5" of the Supreme Court, written by Justice Stevens,
responded to the elaborate elucidations of the cost-benefit issue by refusing to
address it, choosing instead to resolve it at a later date. 5' The Fifth Circuit,
said Justice Stevens, properly held that section 3(8) of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act imposes a substantive limitation on section 6(b)(5).
This limitation "requires the Secretary to find, as a threshold matter, that the
toxic substance in question poses a significant health risk in the workplace
and that a new, lower standard is therefore 'reasonably necessary or appro-
priate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of employment.'
5 2
Because the agency failed to find the presence of a significant health risk, the
plurality disposed of the case without reaching the cost-benefit issue.
47. Brief for Respondents the Rubber Manufacturers Association, supra note 41, at 23 (quoting
Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
48. Id. at 33.
49. Id. at 34. OSHA's argument that it was not required to seek out the data that the expert's test could
have provided and that industry had the burden of presenting any such evidence was countered with a reading of
§ 6(b)(5) of the OSH Act. Industry representatives said that this section "requires the Agency to act on the basis
of 'research, demonstrations, [and] experiments,' and the Act's 'research' provisions give OSHA the means of
doing so." Id. at 38. OSHA, Industry said, cannot be heard to complain that the expert's study was not
"available" to it when it could have (and should have) performed the study itself. The requirement that the
agency regulate on the basis of substantial evidence puts the burden of proof on OSHA, and it cannot shift the
burden of establishing a negative averment to industry. Id. at 38-41.
50. 448 U.S. 607 (1980). Justices Burger and Stewart joined Justice Stevens in the plurality opinion and
Justice Powell concurred in part. Justice Rehnquist concurred in the judgment but wrote a separate opinion.
Justice Marshall was joined in his dissenting opinion by Justices Brennan, White, and Blackmun.
51. Since the decision in Industrial Union Dep't was handed down, the Court has resolved the cost-benefit
issue. In American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 101 S.Ct. 2478 (1981), the Court held that the OSH Act
contains no such requirement. See text accompanying notes 134-36 infra.
52. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,614-15 (1980) (emphasis
added).
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Having thus eliminated the issue of whether OSHA should perform cost-
benefit assessments, Justice Stevens characterized the remaining issue as
"whether the Court of Appeals was correct in refusing to enforce the one ppm
exposure limit on the ground that it was not supported by appropriate find-
ings." 53 He proceeded to resolve this question by construing sections 3(8) and
6(b)(5) as "requir[ing] the elimination, as far as feasible, of significant risks of
harm." 5 4
Justice Stevens argued that to read the Act as OSHA desired-that there
was no requirement for the Secretary to characterize the risk as significant-
would be to construe the agency's mandate to "provide absolutely risk-free
workplaces whenever it is technologically feasible to do so." 55 If OSHA's
construction of the Act was indeed the correct one, he said, "the statute
would make such a 'sweeping delegation of legislative power"' as to be an
unconstitutional violation of the nondelegation doctrine. 6 Thus, the plurality
saw itself faced with a choice: it could strike down as unconstitutional an Act
so broad as to "give the Secretary... unprecedented power over American
industry,"-57 a statute that "would give OSHA power to impose enormous
costs that might produce little ... discernible benefit," 5' or it could strictly
construe the Act, limiting OSHA's power in order to save it.
Justice Stevens then went on to show that even OSHA had not followed
its interpretation of section 6(b)(5).59 If the only no-risk level of exposure to
benzene is zero, then the exposure limit should have been set as close to zero
as technologically possible. Justice Stevens characterized the election of the
one ppm standard as being grounded in administrative convenience and
in the fact that a lower standard could not be justified in terms of the substan-
tial cost of achieving it.60 Reliance on these grounds does serious harm to
OSHA's argument that it must eliminate any risk of harm, no matter what the
cost.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the opinion was its placement of
the burden of proof. OSHA argued that there was substantial evidence to
support a finding of no absolutely safe exposure level for a carcinogen. Be-
cause of this, the agency placed the burden on Industry to prove, "appar-
ently beyond a shadow of a doubt," that a safe level of exposure does exist.
6
'
53. Id. at 630. The plurality also set out as an issue whether the Fifth Circuit's refusal to enforce the dermal
contact ban was appropriate.
54. Id. at 641 (emphasis added).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 646 (quoting Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 539 (1935), and Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935)). While the cited cases established the nondelegation doctrine as a
means for the courts to control government agencies, the doctrine has not been used successfully to attack
agency action since Schechter Poultry.
57. 448 U.S. 607, 645 (1980).
58. Id.
59. Justice Stevens said that, according to OSHA's argument, even if the Secretary is not required to
eliminate threats of insignificant harm. '§ 6(b)(5) still requires the Secretary to set standards that ensure that not
even one employee will be subject to any risk of serious harm-no matter how small that risk may be." Id. at
649.
60. Id. at 650, 651.
61. Id. at 652.
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Justice Stevens responded that OSHA had the burden of showing that more
likely than not the current exposure standard presented a significant risk of
material harm to workers.62 OSHA, he said, had never even attempted to
carry this burden. The best it could do was claim that lowering the permissible
exposure standard from ten ppm to one ppm would produce benefits that were
"'likely' to be 'appreciable.' "63
The plurality disposed of the dermal contact issue 64 on the same grounds
as the airborne exposure standard. The agency, said Justice Stevens, was
required to find that the ban on dermal contact with benzene was "'reason-
ably necessary and appropriate' to remove a significant risk of harm from
such contact. The agency did not make such a finding, but rather acted on the
basis of the absolute, no-risk policy that it applies to carcinogens." 65 This
policy, he said, was not a "proper substitute for the findings of a significant
risk of harm required by the Act." 66
2. Chief Justice Burger's Opinion
Chief Justice Burger concurred in the plurality opinion, but wrote a short
opinion of his own 67 emphasizing the distinction between the functions of the
judiciary and of the administrative agencies. The plurality opinion, he said,
was not to be taken as a restriction on the exercise of legitimate agency
discretion. While the courts may require the agency to consider carefully all
the facts and opinions in its factfinding efforts, the determination of whether a
specific risk of health impairment is significant is a policy decision to be made
by the Secretary. In this area, "[t]he judicial function does not extend to
substantive revision of regulatory policy" 6s so long as the policy judgment is
within the scheme of the statute. Here, the statutory scheme "calls for avoid-
ance of extravagant, comprehensive regulation. Perfect safety is a chimera;
regulation must not strangle human activity in the search for the impos-
sible."-
69
3. Justice Powell's Concurring Opinion
Justice Powell wrote a separate opinion 70 concurring in part with the
plurality. He agreed that section 3(8) imposes limitations on section 6(b)(5) of
the Act, and that the Secretary, when reducing existing exposure standards,
must find both that the current exposure standard presents a significant risk of
62. Id. at 653. Justice Stevens then went on to cite a rule of statutory construction: "'Ordinarily, it is the
proponent of a rule or order who has the burden of proof in administrative proceedings." Id.
63. Id.
64. See note 36 supra.
65. 448 U.S. 607, 662 (1980).
66. Id.
67. 448 U.S. 607, 662 (1980) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
68. Id. at 663.
69. Id. at 664.
70. 448 U.S. 607, 664 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
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material harm and that a lower standard would substantially reduce that
risk.7' He would not, however, go so far as to hold that the agency "'did not
even attempt to carry its burden of proof' on the threshold question of
whether exposure to benzene at ten ppm presents a significant risk to human
health." ' 72 While Justice Powell agreed that OSHA had attempted to carry its
burden by finding that anticipated benefits of a reduced level of exposure
could not be quantified, he found that the agency had failed to carry the
burden with substantial evidence.
Where Justice Powell's opinion differs significantly from that of the
plurality is on the issue of whether the OSH Act requires the agency to
perform cost-benefit assessments. He agreed with the Fifth Circuit that the
Act requires the Secretary to demonstrate that the costs of the proposed
standard are reasonably related to the expected benefits. 73 Thus, he would not
agree that a mere showing of a significant risk of material harm by OSHA
could support the validity of a proposed exposure level.
4. Justice Rehnquist's Opinion
Justice Rehnquist concurred in the result 74 reached by the plurality, but
refused to concur in the opinion. In a separate opinion, he expressed the view
that the legislation at issue represented an unconstitutional delegation of
authority by Congress to the agency. First, he argued that resolution of
important social policy issues, such as whether "the law of diminishing re-
turns should have any place in the regulation of toxic substances," 75 was a
task belonging to Congress. In his view, delegation of this decision to the
Secretary of Labor violates John Locke's caveat: "[L]egislatures are to make
laws, not legislators."-76 Second, he said that the Act fails to provide the
Secretary with any intelligible principles or guidelines to aid him in the exer-
cise of the delegated discretion. Finally, he argued that the standard of
"feasibility" set out in section 6(b)(5) is so broad that it "renders meaningful
judicial review impossible." ' The standard provides no help in determining
what amount of safety is enough. The language contained in section 6(b)(5)
expresses nothing more than wishful thinking; it requires the Secretary to
adopt the best, most protective standard if possible, but excuses him from
doing so if not. 78
71. Id. at 664-65.
72. Id. at 667 (emphasis added).
73. Id.
74. 448 U.S. 607, 671 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
75. Id. at 686.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. -'Read literally, the relevant portion of § 6(b)(5) is completely precatory, admonishing the Secretary to
adopt the most protective standard if he can, but excusing him from that duty if he can't." Id. at 675.
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5. Justice Marshall's Dissenting Opinion
In a lengthy and biting dissent,79 Justice Marshall characterized the
plurality opinion as being "extraordinarily arrogant," "extraordinarily un-
fair, ' ' so and in flagrant disregard of restrictions on judicial authority. He
characterized the decision as an attempt to "bring the authority of the Secre-
tary of Labor in line with the plurality's own views of regulatory policy. '
When the impact of exposure to a toxic substance involves issues of scientific
uncertainty, he argued, it may well be impossible for OSHA to make the
threshold finding that a risk is "significant." When this is the case, the result
of the plurality's approach will be to expose the American labor force to an
ongoing risk of cancer and other occupational diseases and, at the same time,
make the federal government powerless to protect them.82
Justice Marshall was convinced that the Secretary did indeed support his
findings and conclusions with substantial evidence and that the plurality im-
properly engaged in an "independent review of adequately supported findings
made by a technically expert agency."- 83 To support this conclusion, Justice
Marshall himself engaged in a substantial review of the medical and statistical
evidence in the record. Based on this review, he said that "the Secretary
could conclude that regular exposure above the one ppm level would pose a
definite risk resulting in material impairment to some indeterminate but pos-
sibly substantial number of employees." 84
The plurality, argued Justice Marshall, ignored three factors crucial to
judicial review of occupational safety and health standards under the substan-
tial evidence test. First, the issues reviewed often involve a high degree of
technical complexity with which the courts are not prepared to deal. Second,
the issues often are not capable of definitive resolution. Third, when the
question involves determining an acceptable level of risk, policy can have as
much of a bearing on the outcome as the facts. In short, Justice Marshall said
that the substantial evidence test requires that judicial review of agency action
should be, in the long run, deferential. Because of this, the decisions of the
agency are entitled to a presumption of validity, and the courts should be
careful not to substitute their own judgment for that of the agency. 85
Justice Marshall also was concerned with the plurality's finding that the
OSH Act requires a threshold finding of a significant risk of material impair-
ment of health before any standards can be promulgated. He characterized
79. 448 U.S. 607, 688 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 695.
81. Id. at 688.
82. Id. at 714.
83. Id. at 695.
84. Id. at 707.
85. Id. at 705. In other words, what Justice Marshall wanted was substantial evidence that the agency's
decisions were procedurally correct; examination of the substance of the decision, in his view, was not thejob of
the Court. See text accompanying note 139 infra.
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the requirement as an invention of the plurality, having "no relationship to the
acts or intentions of Congress ' 86 and requiring the Secretary to "do the
impossible." 87 The only saving grace that he could find was an indication in
Justice Powell's opinion that the Court's judgment might not be as drastic as
he anticipated. Justice Powell and the plurality, said Justice Marshall, indica-
ted that the Secretary might not be prohibited from promulgating safety
standards when quantifying benefits is impossible.' This interpretation would
allow the agency to set safety standards with only a rough quantification of
the risks posed by a carcinogen and would allow the courts to defer to the
Secretary's finding that the risk was significant.
Justice Marshall concluded by saying that the plurality's approach will
not stand the test of time. "In all likelihood," he said, the "decision will come
to be regarded as an extreme reaction to a regulatory scheme that, as the
Members of the plurality perceived, imposed an unduly harsh burden on
regulated industries." 89 If the result is otherwise, he argued, the American
worker will be forced "to return to the political arena ... to win a victory
that he won once before in 1970." 90
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S DECISION
A. The Plurality Opinion
The plurality derived its threshold significant risk requirement by con-
struing section 3(8) of the Act as imposing substantive limits on section
6(b)(5). The two provisions accordingly can be read together:
The Secretary, in promoting standards dealing with toxic materials or
harmful physical agents under this subsection, shall set as a standard one
or more practices, means, methods, operations, or processes reasonably
necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and
places of employment. Said standard shall be one that most adequately
assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence,
that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional
capacity. 9'
This reading leads to two questions. First, can this hybridized reading of
section 3(8) and section 6(b)(5) be fairly interpreted to require a showing of a
significant risk of material impairment of health? Second, even if such an
interpretation can be made, what impact will it have on the way OSHA
regulates toxic substances?
86. 448 U.S. 607, 713 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 714.
88. Id. at 715.
89. Id. at 723.
90. Id. at 717.
91. This is simply a combined reading of §§ 3(8) and 6(b)(5) of the OSH Act. See text accompanying notes
10 and II supra.
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The plurality answered the first question by posing its converse and then
combining it with the second question: what would be the impact of a statute
that allows OSHA to eliminate by regulation any risk of material harm, no
matter how minute? The plurality, joined by Justices Powell and Rehnquist,
feared that a grant of such power to OSHA was a grant of almost total control
over America's industry and economy. Nonetheless, section 6(b)(5) mandates
among other considerations "the attainment of the highest degree of health
and safety protection for the employee." 92 Congress, in section 2(b), provided
that "its purpose and policy [was] ... to assure so far as possible every
working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions
and to preserve our human resources . . . ." 93 A standard shall be promul-
gated such that it is the one "which most adequately assures ... that no
employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capac-
ity. ... - 94 With such language, it is hard to find a limitation to the effect that
OSHA can regulate only significant risks of material impairment.
As previously mentioned,95 however, it was the plurality's concern with
the broad sweep of power that OSHA would have should its mandate be to
eliminate any risk, no matter how insignificant, that caused it to read in
the threshold requirement. The number of toxic substances currently in use in
industry today is staggering, with a new substance being introduced at the rate
of approximately one every twenty minutes.96 The data on the dangers of
these substances is understandably scarce in many situations. This dearth of
information is especially true of carcinogens, for which the latency periods
are such that the effects of exposure may not appear until years after exposure
has ceased. In industries for which the costs of reducing exposure to accept-
able levels can run into the billions of dollars,97 allowing OSHA to carry out a
no-risk, absolute safety standard could be disasterous.
The potential impact of such power is apparently what caused the plural-
ity and Justice Rehnquist to resurrect the nondelegation doctrine, last used in
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan and Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States."
Justice Harlan once wrote that the reasons for not allowing the Congress to
delegate the legislative power completely are two-fold:
First, it ensures that the fundamental policy decisions in our society will be
made not by an appointed official but by the body immediately responsible to the
people. Second, it prevents judicial review from becoming merely an exercise at
large by providing the courts with some measure against which to judge the official
action that has been challenged.
99
92. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 6(b)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976).
93. Id. at § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976) (emphasis added).
94. Id. at § 6(b)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976) (emphasis added).
95. See text accompanying note 92 supra.
96. Brief for the Federal Parties, supra note 27, at 60-61 n.51.
97. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO v. Marshall, No. 79-1048 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 15, 1980),
as amended, 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1981); AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979); American
Iron and Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978).
98. See note 56 supra. The source of the doctrine is U.S. CONST. art I, § 1, which provides that "all
legislative powers ... shall be vested in a Congress of the United States."
99. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Allowing the Secretary to provide for absolute safety would violate Harlan's
first tenet in the eyes of the plurality, which believed that such a decision should
be made by Congress. Requiring only standards that are "feasible" violated
the second tenet in the eyes of Justice Rehnquist, who believed that such a
limitation on the agency was not a limitation at all.
Whether this decision marks the resurrection of the doctrine against
delegation of legislative power remains to be seen, but most likely it does not.
Since the last use of the doctrine in the days of the New Deal, administrative
agencies have become an accepted part of American government, performing
both legislative and judicial functions. It is not likely that the Court will be
willing to challenge Congress by striking down whole statutory schemes and
eliminating well-entrenched agencies because the power delegated to them is
too broad. 0 Nevertheless, the doctrine's use here may indicate that the
discretion agencies have enjoyed in making policy decisions is going to be
somewhat curtailed. When an existing statute is capable of being construed
either narrowly or broadly, the Court may find the nondelegation doctrine a
convenient reason for choosing the narrow construction.
Even if the requirement of a threshold test was created where none
existed before, and the nondelegation doctrine was used as an excuse for
doing so, the effect may not be as great as that feared by Justice Marshall. In a
footnote to his opinion, Justice Stevens acknowledged that determining
whether a given level of risk is significant is largely a policy decision within
OSHA's scope of authority.'0' Thus, while Justice Stevens argued that the
agency is not empowered to eliminate de minimus risks, he also said that the
agency has the power to define what constitutes such risks.
This power cannot, however, be used to circumvent the problem caused
by requiring OSHA to demonstrate with substantial evidence that there is a
risk. Requiring the agency to draw a distinction demands by necessity a rough
quantification of the risk posed by a toxic substance. This is something that
OSHA said it was not capable of doing for purposes of the benzene standards
and is something it claims cannot be done for many toxic substances, espe-
cially carcinogens.
Requiring a quantification of risk marks an end to generic rule making
such as the agency's issuance of an exposure policy with regard to carcino-
gens. OSHA's efforts to regulate on policy grounds, when the factual issues
100. It should be noted here that only Justice Rehnquist felt that the OSH Act was an overbroad delegation
of power. The plurality opinion considered the possibility that the nondelegation doctrine had been violated, but
refused to so hold. See also the decision in American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 101 S.Ct. 2478 (1981),
where the Court finally ruled that the Occupational Safety and Health Act does not require cost-benefit analysis
While Chief Justice Burger joined in a dissent by Justice Rehnquist on nondelegation doctrine grounds, a
five-to-three majority (which included Justice Stevens, the author of the plurality opinion in Industrial Union
Dep't) upheld the broad regulatory powers of OSHA so long as the requisite "'significant risk" test was satisfied.
See text accompanying notes 134-136 infra.
101. 448 U.S. 607, 655-56 n.62 (1980).
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are "on the frontiers of science and medicine," 12 have been dealt a severe
blow by this decision. 103
The plurality opinion also referred to the assignment of the burden of
proof. In placing upon OSHA the burden of proving "that it is at least more
likely than not that long-term exposure to ten ppm of benzene presents a
significant risk of material health impairment, "' 0 the Court cited the formal
rule making provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).'0 5 The
problem is that these provisions do not apply to OSHA rule making. Even if
they did, the applicable provision would not be section 7, as indicated by the
Court, but section 4 (pertaining to informal notice and comment rule making
procedures). 106 While section 7(d) places the burden of proof on the proponent
of the proposed rule, section 4 has no such provision, and neither does the
OSH Act. Although most appellate courts nonetheless have placed the burden
on the proponent of the rule when informal procedures are required, the
decisions are not in complete agreement. 107
The Court's reliance on the APA is particularly curious in light of the fact
that such reliance is unnecessary. While the OSH Act does not expressly
place the burden of proof on the agency, a reading of its provisions makes it
clear that this was the intent of Congress. Section 11(a) of the Act requires
agency findings to be supported by substantial evidence. Section 3(8) re-
quires standards to be "reasonably necessary or appropriate." Section 6(b)(5)
requires OSHA to support its findings with "the best available evidence,"
using "research, demonstrations, experiments, and such other information as
may be appropriate." In addition, when Congress has wanted to shift the
burden of proof away from an agency and onto industry in other regulatory
efforts, it has said so in the appropriate enabling statutes.I08
102. Id. at 662 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
103. For a thorough discussion of the advantages that generic policies can have when resolving issues such
as the benzene problem, see McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of
Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L.J. 729 (1979).
104. 448 U.S. 607, 653 (1980).
105. Administrative Procedure Act, § 7(d), 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1976). This section provides that -[e]xcept as
otherwise provided by statute, the proponent of a rule or order has the burden of proof."
106. The Administrative Procedure Act sets out general procedures that government agencies must follow
when promulgating rules or adjudicating disputes. Section 556 sets out formal procedures to be followed when
an agency's enabling statutes require rules to be made "'on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing."
Administrative Procedure Act, § 7, 5 U.S.C. § 556 (1976). Section 553 applies to all other agency rule making
procedures, which typically are defined as notice and comment, or informal, proceedings. The Act applies,
however, only where the agency's enabling statutes do not provide for their own procedures. Id. at § 4,5 U.S.C.
§ 553 (1976). Section 6 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act provides procedures to be followed by the
Secretary of Labor when making rules. 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1976). The Administrative Procedure Act is, therefore,
inapplicable to OSHA rule making, though OSHA's procedural requirements do resemble the procedures set out
in § 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act. For a general discussion of OSHA rule making procedures, see 5 J.
CORP. LAW 222 (1979).
107. For a discussion of the placement of burden of proof in informal rule making, see K. DAVIS, ADMINI-
STRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 6:15 (2d ed. 1978).
108. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
925 (1977), in which the court held that Congress had deliberately shifted the burden of proof to require
manufacturers to demonstrate the safety of their pesticides.
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The placement of the burden is important here because it can, to a certain
extent, be separated from the requirement that OSHA show that the risk
sought to be eliminated is significant. In effect, though, it also bars the
agency from promulgating generic exposure standards, such as the no-
exposure limit for carcinogens. A generic policy reducing exposure to toxic
substances to the "lowest level feasible" on the ground that there is an
"inability to demonstrate a threshold or establish a safe level" " clearly does
not satisfy the agency's burden of proof. Instead of a showing by the Secre-
tary of Labor that a given exposure level is hazardous, this kind of policy puts
the burden on Industry to show that the exposure level is not hazardous.
Because of the difficulty of proving a negative, such a policy gives Industry an
impossible task. The plurality's opinion effectively eliminates this problem.
B. The Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion of Justice Marshall was joined by Justices
Brennan, White, and Blackmun and is, therefore, the opinion in which the
greatest number of Justices concurred. Its harsh and vindictive criticism of
the plurality is, however, matched by its own logical inconsistencies.
Justice Marshall chided the plurality for undertaking what he character-
ized as a "nearly de novo review of questions of fact and of regulatory
policy," saying that the plurality's extensive review of the facts was "espe-
cially inappropriate when the factual questions at issue are ones about which
the Court cannot reasonably be expected to have expertise." " The Court, he
said, does not sit "to undertake independent review of adequately supported
scientific findings made by a technically expert agency.""'. This argument, if
taken to its logical conclusion, "would allow the Secretary and OSHA almost
unlimited and unreviewable discretion." 1 2 Furthermore, it ignores the Act's
legislative history and the reason for requiring findings to be supported by
substantial evidence. The legislative history shows that a "substantial evi-
dence" standard of review was added to the bill as a compromise measure. In
Senate floor debates, concern was expressed that the informal rule making
procedures of the reported bill were unfair to the employer: "[W]e cannot just
have a bill set up for the employee and not worry about the employer, because
someone has to provide the job.""I3 The substantial evidence standard was
added because the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review accompany-
ing informal rule making procedures would seriously undermine the right of
employers to a judicial remedy. Under the arbitrary and capricious standard
109. 43 Fed. Reg. 5918, 5932 (1978).
110. 448 U.S. 607, 695 n.9 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
I11. Id. at 695.
112. Connolly, Court's Benzene Decision Sheds Almost No Light, Legal Times of Wash., July 7, 1980, at 2.
113. 116 CONG. REC. 36511-12 (1970), reprinted in S. SUBCOMM. ON LAB. OFTHE COMM. ON LAB. AND
PUB. WELF., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT OF 1970, at 320
(1970).
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"it would be very, very strange if [employers] ... ever win a case.""' 14 The
purpose of the substantial evidence standard was to ensure that the Secretary
had "a record on which to base his findings and to serve as a basis for judicial
review.""115 Thus, Justice Marshall's comments apparently miss the mark.
The reason for requiring findings by OSHA to be supported by substantial
evidence is not to allow the courts to defer to agency findings, as Justice
Marshall suggests, but to ensure that the findings are adequately supported by
the evidence.
Justice Marshall followed his attack on the plurality's standard of review
with an attack on the substance of the review. Agreeing with OSHA that the
agency need not be able to quantify the risk posed by exposure to benzene,
he then went on to argue that the Secretary of Labor had supported his
findings with substantial evidence." 6 To support this contention, he pro-
vided his own extensive, one-sided review of the facts.
Several times in his opinion, Justice Marshall stated that OSHA based its
findings on "direct evidence of incidence[s] of leukemia ... at exposure
levels of ten ppm and below." " A reading of the Secretary's findings, how-
ever, shows only one study that found a risk of leukemia at ten ppm or
below. "8 This study suffered from so many methodological defects that one of
the authors of the study "testified that OSHA had gone 'off the deep end' in
interpreting the study as demonstrating that 'exposures generally below
twenty-five ppm have already induced leukemia.' ""9 OSHA had even con-
ceded that it could not "derive any conclusions linking the excess leukemia
risk observed with any specific exposure level."' 2 Justice Marshall also
noted that, with regard to the dermal contact issue, "[b]oth animal and human
studies had found... absorption" of benzene by the skin.' 2' OSHA's ex-
press findings on this issue, however, were not as definitive as Justice
Marshall's statements indicate. OSHA stated that "[t]he record evidence on
the effect of liquid benzene on the eyes or the skin is extremely limited ....
The few studies of skin effects on animals and humans ... are not definitive
as to the extent of benzene that is absorbed . . . ." 122
Justice Marshall also expressed an opinion concerning the cost-benefit
issue. He argued that there was no requirement that such an assessment be
114. 116 CONG. REC. 36521 (1970), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 113, at 343-344.
115. 116 CONG. REC. 42206 (1970), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 113, at 1218.
116. In this case, the Secretary of Labor found, on the basis of substantial evidence, that (1) exposure
to Benzene creates a risk of cancer... even at the level of I ppm; (2) no safe level of exposure has
been shown; (3) benefits in the form of saved lives would be derived from the permanent standard; (4)
the number of lives that would be saved could turn out to be either substantial or relatively small;
(5) ... it is impossible to calculate even in a rough way the number of lives that would be saved...;
and (6) the standard would not materially harm the financial condition of the covered industries.
448 U.S. 607, 689 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
117. Id. at 707.
118. 43 Fed. Reg. 5918 (1978).
119. Testimony of Ronald Young, as quoted in the Brief for Respondents, supra note 41, at 13.
120. 43 Fed. Reg. 5918, 5927 (1978).
121. 448 U.S. 607, 722 n.35 (1980).
122. 43 Fed. Reg. 5918, 5948 (1978).
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performed but concluded that even if there were one, the analysis had already
been performed. "[T]he Secretary," said the Justice, "made an express find-
ing that the hazards of benzene exposure were sufficient to justify the regula-
tion's costs." 2 3 OSHA did indeed perform a detailed analysis of the costs that
the new regulation would impose on industry. However, when it came to
analyzing the benefits, the agency concluded only that "[w]hile the actual
estimation of the number of cancers to be prevented is highly uncertain, the
evidence indicates that the number may be appreciable." 2 4 While this is a
"finding," there is no evidence in the record to support it. In the words of the
plurality, and contrary to the interpretation of the record presented by Justice
Marshall,
OSHA's rationale for lowering the permissible exposure limit was based, not on
any finding that leukemia has ever been caused by exposure to ten ppm of benzene
and that it will not be caused by exposure to one ppm, but rather on a series of
assumptions indicating that some leukemias might result from exposure to ten
ppm and that the number of cases might be reduced by reducing the exposure level
to one ppm.'1
5
In attacking the plurality's construction of the statute, the dissent re-
sponded to the nondelegation argument only in a footnote. 2 6 The purpose of
the doctrine, said Justice Marshall, was "to assure that the most fundamental
decisions will be made by Congress ... rather than by administrators. Some
minimal definiteness is therefore required in order for Congress to delegate its
authority to administrative agencies." This definiteness was provided by the
word "feasible," which, when read in context with the rest of the statute,
"means technologically and economically achievable." This term, he said,
affords the Secretary "considerably more guidance than ... [that given]
other administrators acting under different regulatory statutes." Instead of
abdicating its responsibility to make the hard choices, Congress made the
choice to protect the American worker from "an indeterminate risk of cancer
and other fatal diseases."' 27
These arguments, while proposing to address the plurality's nondelega-
tion argument, in reality do no more than circle the issue. Justice Marshall's
reading of the statute, which corresponds with OSHA's interpretation, would
give the agency a mandate to eliminate any risk of material harm, no matter
how insignificant. The possibility that this would give OSHA almost total
control over American industry was viewed as more than hypothetical by the
plurality. OSHA, it noted, already had proposed a generic cancer policy,'2
and the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health already had
123. 448 U.S. 607, 720 (1980).
124. 43 Fed. Reg. 5918, 5940 (1978) (emphasis added).
125. 448 U.S. 607, 634 (1980) (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 717 n.30.
127. Id.
128. 42 Fed. Reg. 54,148 (1977).
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published a list of 2415 potential occupational carcinogens.'29 In an age in
which nearly every product made by man seems to cause cancer, giving
absolute control over such substances to a government agency is something
the plurality was just not willing to let Congress do.
V. WHAT THE DECISION MEANS FOR OSHA
A. Initial Reactions
Immediately following the Industrial Union Department decision, OSHA
suspended its cotton dust standard as it applied to the cotton warehousing and
classing industries on the grounds that the threshold "significant risk" stand-
ard had not been met. However, the standard was not lifted for other areas of
the cotton industry because the "significant risk" test allegedly was satis-
fied. 130
Meanwhile, the Fifth Circuit struck down the same cotton dust standard
as it applied to the cotton gin industry.' 3' Relying on the Supreme Court's
opinion in Industrial Union Department, the court held that OSHA had failed
to satisfy the threshold significant risk test. The court went further, however,
and relying on its own opinion in Industrial Union Department32 found that
the agency also had failed to demonstrate that the costs of compliance were
reasonably related to anticipated benefits. By so holding, the court continued
its conflict with the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, which had ruled
that OSHA was not required to perform any cost-benefit analysis in its rule
making process. 33
The Supreme Court recently resolved this dispute between the circuit
courts. In American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan, 34 the Court
held that while OSHA must indeed satisfy the "significant risk" test when
promulgating new regulations, it need not employ cost-benefit analysis in the
process. Rejecting the arguments of Justice Rehnquist in Industrial Union
Department that the word "feasible" as used in section 6(b)(5) of the OSH
Act was not a limitation on the agency, the majority agreed that:
Congress itself defined the basic relationship between costs and benefits, by plac-
ing the "benefit" of worker health above all other considerations save those
making attainment of the "benefit" unachievable. Any standard based on a bal-
129. See 448 U.S. 607, 645 n.51 (1980).
130. 49 U.S.L.W. 2108 (Aug. 12, 1980) (notice of suspension of preamble to cotton dust standard, 29 CFR
1910.1043, on July 25, 1980).
131. Texas Independent Ginners Ass'n v. Marshall, No. 78-2663 (5th Cir. Nov. 14, 1980), 8 oCCUP.
SAFETY & HEALTH CAS. (BNA) 2205.
132. 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978).
133. AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
134. 101 S.Ct. 2478 (1981). Justice Brennan was joined in his majority opinion by Justices Marshall, White,
Blackmun, and Stevens. Justice Stewart filed a dissenting opinion, and Chief Justice Burgerjoined in the dissent
of Justice Rehnquist. Justice Powell took no part in the decision. It should be noted here that Justice Stevens'
position with the majority in American Textile Inst. is extremely important in light of the fact that he authored
the plurality opinion in Industrial Union Dep't.
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ancing of costs and benefits by the Secretary that strikes a different balance than
that struck by Congress would be inconsistent with the command set forth in
§ 6(b)(5). Thus, cost-benefit analysis by OSHA is not required by the statute be-
cause feasibility analysis is.
135
The decision in American Textile Institute takes nothing away from the
plurality opinion in Industrial Union Department. Unlike the situation with
benzene, the Court found that OSHA was able to demonstrate with little
difficulty that exposure to even low levels of cotton dust can and does cause
significant risks of severe bodily harm. In addition, the majority opinion in
American Textile Institute found that OSHA had shown with substantial evi-
dence that compliance with the cotton dust standards by Industry was both
economically and technologically feasible. Thus, the fact patterns in the two
cases were significantly different, and the resulting decisions should be read
in tandem, with Industrial Union Department being viewed as the lower limit
on OSHA's authority and American Textile Institute as the upper limit. As a
result, while OSHA is effectively prohibited from issuing generic regulations
and from requiring protection against de minimis risks, it is not required to
demonstrate that the cost of any regulation is reasonably related to the result-
ing benefits. As long as compliance with the regulation is technologically and
economically feasible and as long as the agency has shown by substantial
evidence that the regulation is aimed at relieving a significant risk of harm,
little can be done by Industry to obtain relief from enforcement.
B. Impact on Administrative Law Problems
The Supreme Court's decision in Industrial Union Department may have
an impact on an issue of administrative law that was not even considered by
the Justices: the scope of judicial review of administrative action. As will be
noted, combining informal rule making with a substantial evidence standard
of review is combining apples with oranges. 13 6 Informal rule making generally
provides the administrative agency with a great deal of discretionary power,
requiring no hearings, testimony, right of cross-examination, and most impor-
tantly, no formal record. In fact, the Court recently struck down an attempt
by an appellate court to require an agency to formalize its proceedings when
the enabling statute called only for notice and comment procedure. 37
The traditional standard to which courts have adhered when reviewing
agency decisions made in informal proceedings has been to insure that such
decisions are not arbitrary and capricious. Such a standard severely limits
court review and gives great discretionary power to the agency. The substan-
tial evidence standard of review is used when an agency is required to act
through formal procedures and when a full transcript of the proceedings is
135. 101 S.Ct. 2478, 2481 (1981).
136. See text accompanying note 138 infra.
137. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1977).
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available. In general, the standard requires that agency decisions be sup-
ported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. It "is more than a
mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
38
To combine informal rule making, which generates no record, with a
substantial evidence standard of review, which requires a record, is to guaran-
tee confusion on the agency's part as to just how much procedure it needs to
protect its findings in court. OSHA, covering all bases, has for the most part
completely formalized its proceedings. The result is that it has generated
reams of very complex and highly technical data in almost every rule making
effort.
The courts have been in disagreement as to how to review such evidence
in an appeal from agency rule making. Judges, after all, are lawyers, and it
would hardly be fair to expect them to be engineers, physicians, chemists, and
architects as well. This problem has led to the development of two schools of
thought. One group has agreed that judges are not competent to analyze the
volumes of data generated in many rule making proceedings. These thinkers
argue that the best way to guard against improper agency action is to make
sure that sufficient procedures that assure "a reasoned decision that can be
held up to the scrutiny of the scientific community and the public"' 39 are
followed by the agency.
The other school argues that, difficult as it may be, if the courts are to
maintain control over the agencies, they must engage in substantive review of
the evidence. Procedural due process, while better than nothing, is no guaran-
tee of substantive due process: "Better no judicial review at all than a charade
that gives the imprimatur without the substance of judicial confirmation that
the agency is not acting unreasonably."140
The Supreme Court's review of the record in Industrial Union Depart-
ment indicates its willingness to follow the thinking of the second school.
Justice Stevens' review of the record, taking up more than ten pages of the
opinion with a general review of the studies and findings presented by OSHA,
reveals no fear of the complexity of the evidence. Justice Marshall sets forth
the same type of review in his dissenting opinion, even while arguing that
substantial deference should be given the agency's findings.
What this means for the future review of agency decisions is difficult to
say. The impact on formal proceedings is likely to be insignificant. When
informal proceedings are combined with a substantial evidence standard of
138. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951).
139. This is the view taken by Chief Judge Bazelon in his concurring opinion in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541
F.2d 1, 66 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). For an example of how this approach works
see the Scenic Hudson cases: Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC (I), 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965); Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC (II), 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971).
140. This is the view expressed by Judge Leventhal in his concurring opinion in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541
F.2d 1, 68-69 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). For an example of this approach see
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
1981]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
review, however, the impact could be great. This is, of course, assuming that
the appellate courts follow the Supreme Court's lead in this and other regula-
tory cases.
Reviewing the vast quantities of data presented by many regulatory pro-
ceedings has proved to be quite time consuming. Further delay is added when
a judge has to acquaint himself with areas with which he is unfamiliar. In a
system with court dockets that are already overloaded, requiring substantive
review could be disastrous. The proponents of the first school also have a
valid argument. In many cases it is unreasonable to expect a judge to be an
expert on the law as well as two or three other highly technical fields. Then,
too, such review could thwart the very reasons for which agencies exist. They
are generally intended to be bodies of experts who can act swiftly to solve
problems. Judicial review of the record not only slows the process of agency
decision making, it also tempts judges to substitute their own judgment for
that of the agency, as Justice Marshall accused the plurality of doing in Indus-
trial Union Department.
On the other hand, substantive review of agency findings may serve to
keep agencies from regulating in areas in which facts are uncertain and poli-
cies ambiguous. If an agency knows its regulatory efforts are going to be
closely scrutinized, it may choose not to press for solutions to problems that
are not easily resolved. This would, in turn, serve to do one of two things.
Either Congress would choose to act on the issue, or the industry would be
left to resolve itself. When the issue is politically sensitive, however, Congress
is not likely to tackle it willingly, and difficult problems simply do not solve
themselves; when left alone, they fester.
VI. CONCLUSION
Whatever the final impact of the Industrial Union Department decision,
it is likely to be important for some time to come. No longer can OSHA
engage in sweeping regulatory efforts to protect the nation's work force from
every conceivable risk. In the area of toxic substances, only those risks that
are significant may be attacked. Lest the agency attempt to deter judicial
supervision of this test, the Court has demonstrated its willingness to roll up
its collective shirt sleeves and delve into whatever technical evidence the
agency cares to generate. However, while industry may have cause to let its
hopes rise, the regulatory battles are by no means over. The image of corpora-
tions as insensitive profit takers that grind the working man into the ground,
an image well deserved in many cases, will be a long time dying.
David Neil Ventker
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